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In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend 
James Morauta∗ 
 
Abstract. A state-based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for 
one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state-based reasons 
to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state-
based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not 
the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state-based 
reasons do satisfy the constraint. The considerations that undermine the Explanatory 
Argument also generate a strong, positive case for the existence of state-based reasons 
to intend.  
 
[A version of this paper appears in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2010).] 
 
 
1. State-Based Reasons to Intend 
 
Just as there can be normative reasons for one to act, so too can there be normative 
reasons for one to intend to act. Just as there can be normative reasons for me to go out 
to dinner, or to work on my paper, or to go for a swim, so too can there be normative 
reasons for me to intend to do these things. But what exactly is the relationship between 
normative reasons to intend and normative reasons to act? (From now on, unless the 
context indicates otherwise, “reason” always means normative reason.) 
 
Here’s one thing that everybody accepts: where F is an action, a fact which is a reason 
for one to intend to F is typically also a reason for one to F.1 But is that always the 
case? Let an object-based reason to intend to F be a fact which is both a reason to 
intend to F and a reason to F; and let a state-based reason to intend to F be a fact which 
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 If you prefer to think of normative reasons as true propositions, and if you think of 
those as something different from facts, that’s fine; translate as required. The questions 
that I’m interested in here don’t turn on this issue. 
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is a reason to intend to F but which is not a reason to F.2 Are there any state-based 
reasons to intend? 
 
Although there has been a lot of debate about this question, the issue remains 
controversial.3 In this paper I want to examine one particular argument against the 
possibility of state-based reasons—what I call the Explanatory Argument. According to 
this argument, state-based reasons are ruled out by a certain explanatory constraint on 
reasons to intend. 
 
While the Explanatory Argument has not to my knowledge been formulated in the 
literature, the intuitions that drive the argument are ones that I often encounter in 
conversations about this topic, and they do, I think, play a significant role in generating 
the sense of unease that many people have about state-based reasons. Furthermore, as 
we’ll see, each of the premises of the argument has support in the literature, and each is 
of substantial independent interest. The Explanatory Argument deserves a careful 
statement and assessment. 
 
Nevertheless, I will claim that we should reject the Explanatory Argument. It’s easy for 
a sense of unease about state-based reasons to linger if it’s not forced to make itself 
explicit. And once we do make this particular sense of unease explicit—in the form of 
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 A word of caution about this terminology: there are quite a few distinctions floating 
around in the literature that sound a bit like this one. Derek Parfit (2001) distinguishes 
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the Explanatory Argument—I think it will become clear that we were wrong to be 
uneasy. As we’ll see, the considerations that undermine the Explanatory Argument also 
generate a strong, positive case for the existence of state-based reasons to intend. These 
considerations raise serious doubts about the prospects for any argument against the 
possibility of state-based reasons. 
 
 
2. The Explanatory Argument 
 
Here’s the basic idea behind the Explanatory Argument: there are no state-based 
reasons to intend because if a fact isn’t a reason for one to perform an action F, then it 
also isn’t a reason for one to intend to F; and that’s because (so the argument goes) 
such a fact couldn’t be the reason for which one intends to F. Let me expand. 
 
It is standard practice in ethics and action theory to distinguish between claims of the 
following kinds: 
 
(N) “M is a reason for S to V”. 
(E) “M is the reason for which S Vs” (or “M is the reason for which S is V-
ing”). 
 
The first claim, (N), is a normative one: it tells us that M counts in favour of S’s V-ing, 
that M provides some degree of justification for S’s V-ing. The second claim, (E), is a 
psychological one: it tells us that M is what is motivates S’s V-ing, that M is the 
consideration in the light of which S is V-ing. The second claim is also an explanatory 
one: when we say that M is the reason for which S Vs, we are giving a distinctive sort 
of psychological explanation of her V-ing—one which cites the considerations that 
motivate her to V. This sort of psychological explanation of S’s V-ing is sometimes 
called a “rationalizing explanation”.4 
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 The contrast between (N) and (E) is often described by saying that in (N), M is a 
“normative reason” for S to V, whereas in (E), M is S’s “motivating reason” for V-ing. 
I have no in-principle objection to this terminology. But in practice, the terminology 
often comes packaged with substantive assumptions about the relationship between 
normative and motivating reasons, and between claims like (N) and (E). Since that 
relationship is part of what’s at issue here, I prefer to avoid framing things in these 
terms. 
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As they are usually understood, and as I will understand them, rationalizing 
explanations like (E) do not imply normative claims like (N). If (E) is true, then M is 
what motivates S’s V-ing; but it doesn’t necessarily follow that M really is a reason for 
S to V—that it provides some degree of justification for S’s V-ing. As is unfortunately 
all too familiar, the considerations that motivate people to do things are often no 
justification at all for them to do those things. 
 
(A terminological aside: we often express rationalizing explanations like (E) in slightly 
different ways. For instance, instead of saying that “such-and-such is the reason for 
which S Vs”, we might instead say that: 
 
“S Vs for the reason that such-and-such”, or that 
“the reason why S Vs is such-and-such”, or that 
“S Vs because such-and-such”. 
 
The last two sorts expressions need a bit of care, however. Although they can be used 
to express the claim that M is the reason for which S Vs, they also have broader 
explanatory uses. In particular, they can be used to give explanations of S’s V-ing 
which are merely causal.5  Consider: “The reason why Sarah is frolicking in the sea is 
that she’s had too much to drink”; or “Ben wants to run for President because he fell 
over and hit his head”. These are not rationalizing explanations. The first explains 
Sarah’s frolicking by citing a mere cause of her frolicking, not by giving the reason for 
which she is frolicking—if indeed there is one. And the second explains Ben’s wanting 
to run for President by citing a mere cause of his wanting to run, not by giving the 
reason for which he wants to run—if indeed there is one. However, so long as we’re 
aware of their broader uses, expressions of these kinds shouldn’t cause us any trouble; 
and since they often allow for more natural wording, I will allow myself to use them. 
Unless I indicate otherwise, you should assume that I am using them to give 
rationalizing explanations.) 
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 I don’t mean to imply that rationalizing explanations aren’t causal explanations, 
because they are. My point is that not all causal explanations are rationalizing 
explanations. Some causal explanations are merely causal: causal but not rationalizing. 
And the “reason why” and “because” locutions can be used to give such merely causal 
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Although these two sorts of claims—(N) and (E)—are distinct, many philosophers 
think that there is nevertheless a link between them. This link has been most widely 
discussed in relation to reasons for action. In that context the thought is this: if M is a 
reason for S to perform some action F, then M could be the reason for which (or one of 
the reasons for which) S Fs. A reason for an agent to perform an action must be such 
that the agent could perform the action, at least in part, for that reason. Call this 
requirement the: 
 
Explanatory Constraint on Reasons to Act. If M is a reason for S to perform some 
action F, then M could be the reason for which (or one of the reasons for which) 
S Fs. 
 
Bernard Williams is a well-known defender of this constraint, but it’s very widely 
accepted.6 
 
If this explanatory constraint on reasons to act is correct, then it’s natural to regard it as 
reflecting something general about reasons, rather than something specifically about 
reasons to act. So it’s natural to think that there will be a parallel constraint on reasons 
to have mental states like intentions and beliefs. 
 
In the case of intentions, the constraint will be this: 
 
Explanatory Constraint on Reasons to Intend. If M is a reason for S to intend to 
perform some action F, then M could be the reason for which (or one of the 
reasons for which) S intends to F. 
 
The idea behind the Explanatory Argument is that facts which aren’t reasons to F don’t 
satisfy this explanatory constraint with respect to intentions to F. A fact which isn’t a 
reason for one to F also isn’t a reason for one to intend to F, and that’s because it 
couldn’t be the reason for which (or one of the reasons for which) one intends to F. 
 
We can set out the argument as follows, with the first premise, (P1),  being the 
explanatory constraint on reasons to intend: 
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The Explanatory Argument 
(P1) If M is a reason for S to intend to F, then M could be the reason for which 
(or one of the reasons for which) S intends to F. 
(P2) If M is not a reason for S to F, then it is not the case that M could be the 
reason for which (or one of the reasons for which) S intends to F. 
(C1) So, if M is not a reason for S to F, then M is not a reason for S to intend to 
F. [From (P1), (P2).] 
(C2) So, there are no state-based reasons to intend. [From (C1), by the 
definition of a state-based reason.] 
 
From now on I’ll often omit explicit mention of the qualifications (“or one of the 
reasons for which”) in premises (P1) and (P2). But you should take them as read 
throughout. 
 
Should we accept this Explanatory Argument? The move from the two premises to 
(C1) is valid, and the move from (C1) to (C2) relies only on the definition of a state-
based reason. So if we want to resist the argument, we’ll need to reject one of the 
premises. Beginning in the next section, I’ll look at each of the premises in turn. 
 
Before I do that, however, I need to address an interpretive question: What is the nature 
of the “could” modality in (P1) and (P2)? 
 
I take it that M could be the reason for which S intends to F just in case it is possible 
that: S intends to F and M is the reason for which S intends to F. But what kind of 
possibility is at issue? There are two natural contenders: some kind of psychological 
possibility, or some kind of conceptual possibility.  
 
There’s a lot that can be said about what these two kinds of possibility amount to, and 
about which provides the better reading of the Explanatory Argument; but I don’t need 
to make a choice between them here. My strategy for responding to the Explanatory 
Argument will allow me to remain neutral about what the best interpretation is.  
 
Here’s why. Although I’ll raise some worries about the first premise, (P1), my main 
target here is the second premise, (P2). In Sections 4 and 5 I will present some cases 
that I take to be counter-examples to (P2). These cases will show that even if M isn’t a 
reason for one to F (and even if one believes that), still it is psychologically possible for 
one to intend to F, and for M to be the reason for which one intends to F. Indeed, the 
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cases make it very plausible that we actually often intend for such reasons. If intending 
for such reasons is psychologically possible, then it is also conceptually possible: the 
psychological possibilities are a subset of the conceptual possibilities. So if I’m right 
about these cases, they show that (P2) is false whether we read the modality as 
psychological or conceptual. That is why I can remain neutral about what the modality 
is. 
 
 
3. Evaluating (P1) 
 
Let’s now turn to look at the premises of the Explanatory Argument, starting with (P1), 
the explanatory constraint on reasons to intend. As with the parallel constraint on 
reasons to act, this constraint is rarely argued for. Most who accept the constraint seem 
to treat it as obvious—perhaps as part of the concept of a reason. However, there are 
some reasons to be suspicious of it. 
 
Consider a few cases (these raise worries both for the constraint on reasons to act and 
for the constraint on reasons to intend):  
 
Case 1: Obsessive Killjoys 
 
Mary is an obsessive killjoy. For some reason or other (perhaps her unusual 
upbringing), she is quite incapable of ever doing anything that she believes would 
be fun. It’s not that Mary is incapable of having fun; she does sometimes catch 
herself having fun, and when she does have fun, it’s good for her. It’s just that 
she is incapable of doing anything that she believes would be fun. If she believes 
something would be fun, then she doesn’t do it, or continue to do it. As it 
happens, there is a concert on tonight, and if Mary goes, she’ll have fun. Given 
how Mary is, the fact that going to the concert would be fun couldn’t be the 
reason for which Mary goes to the concert. (The fact that going to the concert 
would be fun is the reason for which Mary goes to the concert only if Mary 
believes that going to the concert would be fun; but we’ve just said that she is 
incapable of doing anything that she believes would be fun.) Does it follow that 
the fact that going to the concert would be fun isn’t a reason for Mary to go? 
Intuitively, no: having fun is after all good for her. 
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Similarly for intentions. Given how Mary is, the fact that going to the concert 
would be fun couldn’t be the reason for which Mary intends to go to the concert. 
Does it follow that the fact that going to the concert would be fun isn’t a reason 
for Mary to intend to go? Intuitively, no: having fun is after all good for her. 
 
Case 2: Surprise Parties7 
 
Will very much enjoys surprise parties, that is, parties that he isn’t aware of in 
advance. As it happens, there is a surprise party waiting for him next door—a 
party that he isn’t aware of. The fact that there is a surprise party waiting for him 
next door couldn’t be the reason for which Will goes next door. (The fact that 
there is a surprise party waiting for him next door is the reason for which Will 
goes next door only if Will believes that there is a surprise party waiting for him 
next door; but that’s not a belief that it is possible for him to have. Will can’t 
believe that there is a surprise party waiting for him next door—a party that he 
isn’t aware of.)8 Does it follow that the fact that there is a surprise party waiting 
for him next door isn’t a reason for Will to go next door? Intuitively, no: he does 
after all enjoy surprise parties. 
 
Similarly for intentions. The fact that there is a surprise party waiting for him 
next door couldn’t be the reason for which Will intends to go next door. Does it 
follow that the fact that there is a surprise party waiting for him next door isn’t a 
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9 
reason for Will to intend to go next door? Intuitively, no: he does after all enjoy 
surprise parties. 
 
Case 3: Mercenary “Friendships” 
 
Although Jill doesn’t like Rose much, she has one very good reason to be friends 
with her. Jill is constantly getting into financial trouble, and if Jill and Rose were 
friends, then Rose, who is very rich, would lend Jill money if she needed it. 
Intuitively, the fact that Rose lends money to her friends is a reason for Jill to be 
friends with Rose. But it couldn’t be the reason for which Jill is friends with 
Rose. Why not? Because then their relationship wouldn’t be a friendship. If the 
reason for which Jill is in a certain relationship with Rose is that Rose lends 
money to her friends, then their relationship isn’t a friendship. At best, it’s the 
kind of relationship that would have been a friendship, if the reason for which Jill 
had been in the relationship had been of the right kind. 
 
Like the first two cases, this third case raises a worry for the explanatory 
constraint on reasons to act; but it’s trickier to extend this last example to cover 
intentions. Even if the fact that Rose lends money to her friends couldn’t be the 
reason for which Jill is friends with Rose, perhaps that fact could be the reason 
for which Jill intends to be friends with Rose. For Jill’s intention might be an 
intention to be friends with Rose for the right reasons—where the “for the right 
reasons” attaches to the being and not the intending. 
 
These are admittedly unusual cases, and I don’t expect them to be uncontroversial. 
Still, they make it clear that those who want to rely on the explanatory constraint do 
need to say something—and more than they usually say—to defend the constraint.9 
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Although I have reservations about the explanatory constraint, I don’t want to get 
bogged down in trying to assess it, because there is a bigger problem with the 
Explanatory Argument to worry about. For now, let’s assume that the explanatory 
constraint is correct. If it turns out to be false, so much the worse for the Explanatory 
Argument. 
 
 
4. Evaluating (P2) 
 
What about the second premise of the Explanatory Argument, (P2)? I repeat it here for 
convenience: 
 
(P2) If M is not a reason for S to F, then it is not the case that M could be the 
reason for which (or one of the reasons for which) S intends to F. 
 
Many philosophers have endorsed (P2).10 They think that the reasons for which one 
intends to do something are always, and could only be, reasons to do that thing. Put 
slightly differently: they think that the only considerations that could motivate one to 
intend to do something are considerations which are reasons to do that thing. This view 
is a fairly natural one; I suspect that it is most people’s first stop. But when one looks at 
it carefully, I think it’s clear that it doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. 
 
To see one problem with (P2), consider Erica’s case. It is Tuesday, and Erica is in the 
pub with a beer before her on the table. The fact that it is Tuesday is, let’s suppose, not 
a reason for Erica to drink the beer. But suppose Erica believes, falsely, that that fact is 
a reason for her to drink the beer. It should be uncontroversial that, in such a case, the 
fact that it is Tuesday could be the reason for which Erica intends to drink the beer. 
Erica could intend to drink the beer, and the fact that it is Tuesday could be the reason 
for which she intends to drink it. Since, by hypothesis, the fact that it is Tuesday is not 
a reason for Erica to drink the beer, Erica’s case is a counter-example (P2). 
 
In general, let a false belief case be a case in which M is not a reason for S to F, but in 
which S believes, falsely, that M is a reason for her to F. Many false belief cases will be 
cases in which M could be the reason for which S intends to F. Erica’s case is an 
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example. Such cases are counter-examples to (P2)—though as we’ll in the next section, 
they aren’t the only counter-examples. 
 
How might proponents of the Explanatory Argument respond to false belief cases? 
They might try adjusting (P2) in some way. A natural move would be to modify the 
antecedent of (P2) so that it applies not to any fact which is not a reason for the agent to 
F, but only to facts which the agent believes are not reasons for her to F. (Alternatively, 
they might modify the antecedent so that it applies only to facts which the agent does 
not believe are reasons for her to F. Parallel points will apply.) This would give us: 
 
(P2*) If S believes that M is not a reason for her to F, then it is not the case that 
M could be the reason for which (or one of the reasons for which) S 
intends to F. 
 
False belief cases do not generate counter-examples to (P2*), since in false belief cases 
the antecedent of (P2*) is false. 
 
If we replace (P2) with (P2*) we get a new version of the Explanatory Argument, with 
a new conclusion: 
 
Revised Explanatory Argument 
(P1) If M is a reason for S to intend to F, then M could be the reason for which 
(or one of the reasons for which) S intends to F. 
(P2*) If S believes that M is not a reason for S to F, then it is not the case that M 
could be the reason for which (or one of the reasons for which) S intends 
to F. 
(C1*) So, if S believes that M is not a reason for S to F, then M is not a reason 
for S to intend to F. [From (P1), (P2*).] 
(C2*) So, if S believes that M is not a reason for S to F, then M is not a state-
based reason for S to intend to F. [From (C1*), by the definition of a 
state-based reason.] 
 
Notice that even if this revised argument is sound, it isn’t an argument against the 
possibility of state-based reasons to intend. The new conclusion doesn’t rule out the 
possibility of reasons to intend to F which are not reasons to F. Nevertheless, if this 
new conclusion were true, that would still be an interesting result. 
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However, this revised argument isn’t sound either. In the next section I will present 
some cases which show that both the original premise (P2) and the revised premise 
(P2*) are false. In addition to showing that the Revised Explanatory Argument is 
unsound, these cases will therefore give us further grounds to reject the original 
Explanatory Argument—grounds which are independent of false belief cases. 
 
 
5. More Counter-Examples 
 
Before I get to the cases, one quick comment about their structure. So far I deliberately 
haven’t said much about the kinds of facts that are supposed to be state-based reasons 
to intend. But it will help now to make things a bit more concrete. In order to do this, I 
will focus on a class of facts that are particularly good candidates for being a state-
based reasons to intend: namely, facts about the possible benefits of intending.  
 
To be a bit more precise, it’s natural for a defender of state-based reasons to think that 
facts of the form S’s intending to F might lead to B (where B is some particular 
beneficial outcome) can be state-based reasons for S to intend to F. All the candidates 
for state-based reasons that I will consider in this section are facts of this form. 
 
5.1 The Toxin Puzzle 
 
The most widely discussed case in this area is Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle.11 
However, the Toxin Puzzle has some complicating features that make it a bad place to 
start one’s thinking about state-based reasons. Verdicts about the Toxin Puzzle should 
come pretty close to the end of the investigation, not the beginning. 
 
Kavka asks us to consider a case in which an agent’s intending to perform a certain 
action (drinking a harmful but non-lethal vial of toxin at noon the next day) might be 
beneficial. But the case has some unusual features. First, most people think that the 
agent ought not to perform the action; indeed, that she has no reason at all to perform 
it.12 Furthermore, it’s tempting to think that anybody who was in the agent’s situation 
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would believe those normative claims. Second, it’s also tempting to think that anybody 
who was in the agent’s situation would not perform the action, and would believe 
that.13 These features introduce unnecessary complications, and so it’s better to begin 
with cases that don’t have these features. The two cases that I consider below are 
designed with this in mind. 
 
Simplifying in order to screen out these distracting features is an important 
methodological step, not just for our immediate purpose of assessing the Explanatory 
Argument, but also for the eventual resolution of more complicated cases. Once we are 
clear about what is going on in the simpler cases, we can then think about how the 
addition of extra features, such as those present in the Toxin Puzzle, might change 
things. (I’ll have a bit more to say about the Toxin Puzzle in Section 6.1.) 
 
5.2 Arm Raising 
 
So, consider the following variation on the Toxin Puzzle: 
 
Arm Raising. An eccentric but trustworthy billionaire promises me a million 
dollars if I intend, in thirty seconds from now, to raise my arm in one minute 
from now. The billionaire doesn’t care about whether or not I actually raise my 
arm in a minute from now; she’s only interested in what intentions I have in thirty 
seconds from now. She has access to a method that will allow her to determine 
with great reliability whether or not I have the intention at the relevant time. If 
she concludes in thirty seconds from now that I do have the intention at that time, 
then she will straightaway—and irrevocably—deposit the money in my bank 
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will do whatever they intend to do? And so on. 
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account, and the transaction will be complete before the time comes for me to 
carry out the intention (she’ll make an instantaneous electronic funds transfer). 
However, if she concludes in thirty seconds from now that I don’t have the 
intention at that time, then I don’t win the money. I know all of this. 
 
Notice that, given the way that this case is set up, whether or not I actually raise my 
arm in a minute from now will have no effect on whether or not I win the money. In a 
minute from now, when the time comes for me to raise my arm, it will already have 
been determined whether or not I have won the money. Nothing I can do then will 
affect my bank account. 
 
Let the Prize Fact be the fact that my intending to raise my arm might win me a million 
dollars. Given what I said in the last paragraph, the Prize Fact is not a reason for me to 
actually raise my arm. It might well be a reason for me to do something; but it’s not a 
reason for me to raise my arm. It is also very plausible that the Prize Fact is a reason for 
me to intend to raise my arm; in which case, it is a state-based reason for me to intend 
to raise my arm. For the moment, however, I’m not interested in the final verdict about 
whether or not the Prize Fact is a state-based reason. For now, set aside that larger issue 
and consider the following more specific question. 
 
Suppose I believe, correctly, that the Prize Fact is not a reason for me to actually raise 
my arm. Could I nevertheless intend to raise my arm, and intend to do so because (or at 
least in part because) so intending might win me a million dollars? Could the reason for 
which (or one of the reasons for which) I intend to raise my arm be that so intending 
might win me a million dollars? 
 
I think the answer is yes: I could indeed intend to raise my arm for that reason. I admit 
that I’m not completely confident of this, because I’m not completely confident that I 
know all the nuances of my own psychology. Still, I’m fairly sure that I could do it, 
perhaps aided by a little bit of psychological training; and I’m quite sure that someone 
could do it. Even if I myself don’t have the psychology for the job, there are surely 
people who do. Arm Raising (or a version of it in which a psychologically suitable 
agent takes my place) is therefore a counter-example to both (P2) and (P2*). 
 
15 
5.3 Movie Decisions 
 
The Arm Raising case is obviously artificial, but there are also many everyday counter-
examples to (P2) and (P2*). For instance, consider:  
 
Movie Decisions. Claire is trying to decide whether to go and see a movie 
tonight, or else stay home and have dinner with her friends. The pros and cons are 
evenly balanced: although the advantages and disadvantages of the two options 
are rather different, there’s nothing much to choose between them. Claire has 
been thinking about the matter for a while now, and her dithering is distracting 
her from what she is supposed to be doing. She would therefore like to settle the 
issue quickly, so she can put the matter out of her mind and get on with some 
work this afternoon. And from past experience of cases like this, Claire knows 
that once she does make a decision, it is likely to have just that effect—for she is 
good at moving on once she has made a decision. 
 
Let the Strategic Fact be the fact that Claire’s deciding, and so intending, to go to the 
movie tonight is likely to put the matter out of her mind and allow her to get on with her 
work. This fact is not a reason for Claire to actually go to the movie. But it is plausibly 
a reason for her to intend to go the movie; in which case it’s a state-based reason for 
her to intend to go the movie. For the moment, however, set aside that larger issue and 
consider the following more specific question. 
 
Suppose Claire believes, correctly, that the Strategic Fact is not a reason for her to go to 
the movie. Could she nevertheless intend to go the movie, and intend to do so because 
(or at least in part because) her so intending is likely to put the matter out of her mind 
and allow her to get on with her work? Surely the answer is again yes. Movie Decisions 
therefore gives us another counter-example to (P2) and (P2*). 
 
Cases like Movie Decisions are particularly important because they make it clear that 
counter-examples to (P2) and (P2*) need not be based on artificial, one-off cases like 
Arm Raising (or even worse, the Toxin Puzzle). Counter-examples also arise in 
everyday contexts. The key point to note here is that there are a range of distinctive 
benefits which are regularly generated by intentions in everyday contexts.14 
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 For an influential discussion of these benefits, see Bratman 1987. 
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One example, which is illustrated by Movie Decisions, is that intentions often have 
allocation benefits: by settling in advance what one is going to do, intending to do 
something can curtail deliberation, and thus free up valuable resources (time, 
deliberative effort, and so on) to be spent on other tasks. Another example is that 
intentions often have both intra- and inter-personal co-ordination benefits: by 
committing us to performing certain actions, intending to do something can generate 
fixed points which help us to plan and co-ordinate our behaviour. If Claire now 
decides, and so intends, to go to the movie tonight, that will do more than put the 
matter out of her mind and allow her to get on with her work. It will also give her time 
to confirm with Jack that she’ll be going to the movie; to buy cheap tickets in advance; 
and to warn her friends that she won’t be home for dinner, so that they don’t cook extra 
for her. 
 
These familiar sorts of benefits of intending crop up everywhere, and in many of these 
cases the situation is the same as it is in Movie Decisions. With respect to these familiar 
sorts of benefits of intending, it seems clear that we can, and often do, intend to do 
things because (or at least in part because) so intending might have those benefits. And 
we can do all this while recognizing—what is usually the case—that these facts about 
the possible benefits of intending are not reasons to actually perform the action 
intended. These everyday cases have been surprisingly neglected in the debate over 
state-based reasons to intend.15 But once we pay attention to them, we can see that they 
provide a fertile source of counter-examples to (P2) and (P2*).16 
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 Clarke 2007 is an exception. 
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 Another interesting set of everyday cases to think about involve what Richard Holton 
(2003) calls “resolutions”. According to Holton, “[r]esolutions are intentions part of 
whose function is to defeat contrary inclinations” that one expects to have (2003, p. 
42). It’s not entirely clear how to cash out this notion of “function”. But here’s one 
thought: to resolve to F is (perhaps among other things) to intend to F, and to so intend 
in part because so intending might help one to defeat contrary inclinations. Knowing 
that I will be tempted to drink too much at dinner, I resolve to have no more than two 
drinks; that is (perhaps among other things), I intend to have no more than two drinks, 
and I so intend in part because so intending might help me to resist temptation. The 
fact that intending to have no more than two drinks might help me to resist temptation 
is not itself a reason for me to have no more two drinks; and I know that. So if it is 
possible for me to form such a resolution, that would be another counter-example to 
17 
 
One last point. There is an interesting difference between Arm Raising and Movie 
Decisions which has to do with the source of the state-based reasons to intend.17 
 
Say that a fact is a general incentive for one to make up one’s mind about whether to F 
just in case, for all G such that intending to G is a way of making up one’s mind about 
whether to F, the fact is a reason for one to intend to G. In Movie Decisions, Claire’s 
state-based reason to intend to go to the movie derives from a general incentive for her 
to make up her mind about whether to go to the movie; whereas the parallel claim is not 
true in Arm Raising. My state-based reason to intend to raise my arm—that my so 
intending might win me a million dollars—does not derive from any general incentive 
for me to make up my mind about whether to raise my arm, for I don’t have any such 
general incentive.18 
 
I’ve discovered that some people react to Arm Raising and Movie Decisions in 
different ways. While they’re happy to agree with my claims about Movie Decisions, 
they’re less convinced about Arm Raising. But why should we treat the cases 
differently? One possibility is that it has something to do with the differences in general 
incentives. Perhaps cases where agents have a general incentive to make up their mind 
on some question should be treated differently from cases where they do not? 
 
I’m not sympathetic to this move. If general incentives to make up one’s mind can be a 
source of state-based reasons to intend, it’s hard to see why state-based reasons 
couldn’t also come from other sources—as they do (I claim) in Arm Raising. Anyway, 
for present purposes I don’t need to rely on Arm Raising. Cases like Movie Decisions 
are enough on their own to undermine both versions of the Explanatory Argument. And 
they are also enough to make a strong, positive case for the existence of state-based 
reasons to intend (more on this positive point at the end of the paper). 
                                               
(P2) and (P2*). 
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 Thanks to Mark Schroeder for pressing this point. 
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 Nothing about the billionaire’s promise generates a general incentive for me to make 
up my mind about whether to raise my arm. This is because nothing about the 
billionaire’s promise generates a reason for me to intend not to raise my arm—even 
though intending not to raise my arm is a way of making up my mind about whether to 
raise my arm. 
18 
 
 
6. Further Comments 
 
That completes my case against the Explanatory Argument. I’ll finish with two further 
sets of comments. 
 
6.1 Belief-Constraints on Intentions 
 
The following belief-constraint on intentions is widely accepted: necessarily, if one 
believes that one won’t F, then one does not intend to F.19 This implies that one cannot 
both believe that one won’t F, and intend to F. Might this belief-constraint in some way 
help the Explanatory Argument? 
 
Well, the belief-constraint doesn’t support premise (P2) of the Explanatory Argument, 
but it does arguably entail yet another weaker version of the second premise. Suppose S 
believes that she won’t F. Given the belief-constraint, it seems to follow that S cannot 
intend to F (or at least, that seems to follow if it’s also true that S cannot not believe 
that she won’t F—so let’s assume that that is also true).20 And if S cannot intend to F 
then, for all M, it is not the case that M could be the reason for which S intends to F. (If 
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 See, e.g., Adams 1986, p. 288; Bratman 1987, chs. 3, 8; Mele 1992, ch. 8. Some 
people accept a stronger belief-constraint: they think that, necessarily, if one doesn’t 
believe that one will F, then one does not intend to F (e.g. Grice 1971; Harman [1976] 
1999; Velleman 1989, ch. 4). With suitable adjustments, what I say will apply to this 
constraint as well. 
20
 A little more slowly: on a natural reading of “can” and “cannot”, the premise (A1) 
and the belief-constraint (BC):  
 (A1) S believes that she won’t F 
 (BC) S cannot both believe that she won’t F, and intend to F 
imply the conclusion: 
 (C) S cannot intend to F 
only if we add the further premise: 
 (A2) S cannot not believe that she won’t F. 
So I’ll assume for the purposes of the discussion in this section that (A2) is also true. 
19 
one cannot intend to do something, then one cannot intend to do it for a reason either.) 
Finally, if that last claim is true, then it is also true in the special case where M is not a 
reason for S to F. 
 
So, the belief-constraint entails the following principle: 
 
(P2#) If M is not a reason for S to F, and S believes that she will not F (and S 
cannot not believe that), then it is not the case that M could be the reason 
for which (or one of the reasons for which) S intends to F. 
 
I’ve formulated the principle in this way in order to make it transparent how it slots into 
the Explanatory Argument. This formulation is perhaps slightly misleading, since one 
of the claims in the antecedent, that M is not a reason for S to F, plays no essential role. 
As we just saw, if the belief-constraint entails (P2#), that’s because it entails a parallel 
principle for every fact M, whether or not it is a reason for S to F. Still, the belief-
constraint does entail (P2#). 
 
(P2#) is considerably weaker than (P2), and it isn’t much help to the opponent of state-
based reasons to intend. When we plug (P2#) in as the second premise of the 
Explanatory Argument, we can derive only a very weak conclusion: 
 
(C#) If M is not a reason for S to F, and S believes that she will not F (and S 
cannot not believe that), then M is not a state-based reason for S to intend 
to F. 
 
I don’t deny that this conclusion might rule out some alleged cases of state-based 
reasons to intend. But many cases will remain untouched, since in many cases the 
agents won’t have the belief profile which is needed to make the antecedent of the 
relevant instance of (C#) true. 
 
Take Arm Raising and Movie Decisions. In my description of these cases I didn’t 
specify what sorts of beliefs Claire and I have about what we will do. So actually there 
are many versions of each of these cases—versions which differ according to what 
sorts of beliefs Claire and I have about what we will do. Now, we can certainly 
construct versions in which I believe that I won’t raise my arm when the time comes 
(and cannot not believe that), and in which Claire believes that she won’t go to the 
movie tonight (and cannot not believe that). In these special versions of Arm Raising 
20 
and Movie Decisions, the antecedents of the relevant instances of (C#) are indeed true. 
So (C#) implies that these special cases don’t generate examples of state-based reasons 
to intend: in these special cases, the fact that my intending to raise my arm might win 
me a million dollars is not a state-based reason for me to intend to raise my arm; and 
the fact that Claire’s intending to go to the movie will have certain allocation and co-
ordination benefits is not a state-based reason for her to intend to go to the movie. But 
of course, there are other versions of Arm Raising and Movie Decisions in which Claire 
and I don’t have these special belief profiles; and in such cases, (C#) has no purchase. 
 
Parallel points apply to the Toxin Puzzle. We can construct versions of the puzzle in 
which the agent believes she won’t drink the toxin at noon the next day (and cannot not 
believe that). (C#) implies that, in these versions of the puzzle, the fact that the agent’s 
intending to drink the toxin might win the agent a million dollars is not a state-based 
reason for the agent to intend to drink the toxin. But, once again, there are other 
versions of the Toxin Puzzle in which the agent doesn’t have this special belief profile; 
and in such cases, (C#) has no purchase.21 
 
In summary: the belief-constraint on intending implies that where an agent has a very 
special sort of belief profile, the fact her intending to do something might be beneficial 
is not a state-based reason for her to intend to do that thing. This is an interesting 
observation, but it has limited broader significance. For the belief constraint is silent 
about those many cases—including versions of Arm Raising, Movie Decisions, and the 
Toxin Puzzle—in which the agent doesn’t have the special belief profile. 
 
6.2 Rational Requirements 
 
Some philosophers think that, if the reason for which (or one of the reasons for which) 
one intends to F is something other than a reason to F, then one is irrational.22 Their 
view is that, if we do intend for that sort of reason, then we violate a certain rational 
requirement. We can formulate it like this: 
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 See again n. 13 above. 
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 Kavka once held something like this view: see Kavka 1978, p. 292. For a similar 
claim see Farrell 1993, p. 59. 
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Motivational Reasons Requirement. Rationality requires of S that: if M is not a 
reason for S to F, then M is not the reason for which (or one of the reasons for 
which) S intends to F. 
 
If the Motivational Reasons Requirement were correct, would it support (P2)? No, 
because (P2) is a claim about what is possible, not about what is rational. What (P2) 
says is that, if M is not a reason for S to F, then M could not be the reason for which S 
intends to F. And the Motivational Reasons Requirement doesn’t imply that.  
 
For my purposes in this paper, I thus have no particular beef with the Motivational 
Reasons Requirement. Since the requirement doesn’t help the Explanatory Argument, I 
don’t need to reject the requirement. But while I’m on the topic, I may as well say that I 
do think we ought to reject it. 
 
I don’t deny that there could be cases in which the reason for which an agent intends to 
F is something other than a reason to F, and in which the agent is also irrational. That 
can no doubt happen. But in cases like this, it’s not the reason for which the agent 
intends to F that makes her irrational. The agent’s irrationality in such cases can always 
be traced to other sources. 
 
For example, suppose that the reason for which Emily intends to F is something other 
than a reason to F, but she also believes that she ought not to F. (Suppose, for example, 
that Emily is in the toxin puzzle; that she intends to drink the toxin, and that the reason 
for which she so intends is that her so intending might win her the prize; but that she 
also believes she ought not to drink the toxin.) In such a case, Emily is irrational. But 
her irrationality has nothing to do with the reasons for which she intends to F. The 
explanation for why Emily is irrational is rather that rationality requires her not to have 
akratic intentions: rationality requires her not to both intend to F and believe that she 
ought not to F. It is the fact that Emily violates this rational requirement, and not the 
reasons for which she intends to F, which explains why she is irrational.  
 
As far as I can tell, the mere fact that the reason for which one intends to F is 
something other than a reason to F doesn’t by itself make one irrational. Think again 
about our examples. If I intend to raise my arm because (or at least in part because) my 
so intending might win me the million dollars, would that by itself make me irrational? 
Surely not. If Claire intends to go to the movie because (or at least in part because) her 
so intending will put the matter out of her mind and allow her to get on with her work, 
22 
would that by itself make her irrational? Surely not. These cases, and others like them, 
show that the Motivational Reasons Requirement is false. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
My first conclusion is negative: the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because its 
second premise, (P2), is false. Once we pay attention to the right sorts of examples it 
becomes clear that, contrary to (P2), the reasons for which we intend to do things can 
be, and often are, facts which are not reasons to do those things. (I also have some 
reservations about the first premise of the Explanatory Argument, (P1), though I 
haven’t pressed those here.) If there are grounds to deny that there any state-based 
reasons to intend, they don’t come from these sorts of explanatory considerations.  
 
But we can also say something more positive, and more general. Although I don’t 
claim it’s a knock-down proof, I do think that the various examples that we’ve looked 
at make a strong positive case for the existence of state-based reasons to intend. It’s a 
strong case because it appeals not just to baroque, one-off examples like Arm Raising 
(or even worse, the Toxin Puzzle), but also to prosaic, everyday examples like Movie 
Decisions. Indeed, although you wouldn’t think it from reading the literature, it’s the 
everyday examples that are really the bread-and-butter of the positive case for state-
based reasons to intend. 
 
Any argument against the possibility of state-based reasons will have to reject all these 
everyday examples. It will have to show that, even though intending often has these 
familiar sorts of benefits (for instance, allocation and co-ordination benefits); and even 
though we are often aware of these benefits; and even though we can, and sometimes 
do, intend to do things because so intending might have these benefits—nevertheless, 
the fact that one’s intending to do something might have such a benefit is never a 
reason for one so to intend. The prospects for such an argument seem to me pretty dim. 
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